The International Fallout from Chernobyl by Hartke, Victoria Riess
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 5
Number 2 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 8
1987
The International Fallout from Chernobyl
Victoria Riess Hartke
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hartke, Victoria Riess (1987) "The International Fallout from Chernobyl," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 5: No. 2, Article 8.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol5/iss2/8
The International Fallout From
Chernobyl
"The odds of a meltdown are one in 10,000 years."
1
I. Introduction
On April 26, 1986,2 one of the worst nuclear reactor meltdowns
and explosions in history occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in
the Soviet Union.3 The explosion caused a nuclear reactor fire that
burned for twelve days.' The fire released into the atmosphere lethal
forms of iodine and cesium, as well as other highly dangerous radio-
active emissions.5
The explosion occurred during a test conducted by plant em-
ployees to determine how long the reactor's turbines would run once
the generators are cut off. As part of this test, plant operators
stripped the reactor of all safety mechanisms. This rendered the re-
actor powerless to check or restrain its own progress, as it would
have done if the safety features were operational.' Xenon gas and
steam pressure quickly accumulated inside the reactor after the
I. The Nuclear Power Industry in the Ukraine, SOVIET LIFE, Feb. 1986, at 8 (statement
of Vitali Sklyarov, Minister of Power and Electrification for the Soviet Ukraine, concerning
the safety of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant) [hereinafter Nuclear Power Industry]. A
shift superintendent at Chernobyl added that "working at the plant is safer than driving a
car." Id. at 12.
2. Serrill, Anatomy of a Catastrophe, TIME, Sept. I, 1986, at 26, 27. Workers at the
Forsmark nuclear power plant in Sweden were the first to discover concentrations of radiation
greater than normal when they tested clothing and found amounts of radiation far above con-
tamination levels. Greenwald, Deadly Meltdown, TIME, May 12, 1986, at 38, 39 [hereinafter
Deadly Meltdown]. See generally Radiation How Much Is Too Much?, REDBOOK, Oct.
1986, at 30 (discussion of "acceptable" doses of radiation) [hereinafter Radiation].
3. The Chernobyl plant, built in 1977, was the first nuclear power station in the
Ukraine. Nuclear Power Industry, supra note 1, at 12.
4. Serrill, supra note 2, at 27. In addition to dumping sand, lead, boron and water on
the blaze, Soviet workers tunneled beneath the reactor in an attempt to seal off the damaged
unit from below with concrete. This measure was an effort to protect the ground and underly-
ing water table. Greenwald, More Fallout From Chernobyl, TIME, May 19, 1986, at 44, 46
[hereinafter More Fallout].
5. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 41. Iodine 131, among the deadliest of the emis-
sions, rapidly collects and remains in the human thyroid gland. Radiation, supra note 2, at 30.
6. In order to complete the test, operators turned off the emergency cooling system.
Realizing that the reactor power had been inadvertently lowered too much, they attempted to
increase it by activating all the water circulation pumps. This made the reactor more difficult
to control. The automatic shut-off signal was blocked in order to insure the system's continued
operation once the turbines stopped. Before completion of the final tragic step of removing all
but six or eight of the thirty control rods, the workers eliminated the safety devices which
halted the reactor if steam pressure or water levels became abnormal. Serrill, supra note 2, at
26-27.
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shutdown of the generators. 7 Ultimately, the pressure tore a hole in
the roof of the building that housed the reactor. Oxygen rushed in
from outside and kindled a graphite fire. The fire spewed radioactive
particles into the wind and, consequently, to areas beyond the bor-
ders of the Soviet Union.8
The town of Pripyat, which surrounds Chernobyl, felt the im-
mediate effects of the blast most strongly9 and remained too radioac-
tive for habitation for at least several weeks thereafter.10 Reservoirs
near the plant were also significantly contaminated. The Soviet
Union suffered at least thirty-one fatalities linked directly to the mis-
hap. 11 This number only begins to state the extent of health dam-
age, however, since other countries felt the effects of the blast as
well.
Poland sustained heavy fallout. The Polish Government advised
mothers to have all their children below age sixteen injected with
shots of iodine solution. 2 Milk was banned because the cows had
been grazing on irradiated grass. 1a In Rumania, government officials
declared a state of alert, advising people to stay inside and to avoid
drinking rainwater." Sweden suffered at least $144 million in dam-
ages due to the ruination of food.' The livelihood of 15,000 Lapp
nomads in central Sweden continues to be threatened because radia-
tion has contaminated the reindeer they raise and the berries and
fish they eat." Sheep farmers in Great Britain were unable to bring
their animals to slaughter because the sheep had ingested contami-
nated grass.'
7. Marbach, Anatomy of a Catastrophe, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1986, at 26, 27.
8. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 49.
9. Serrill, supra note 2, at 29.
10. At distances of three to four miles from the plant, residents stood a 50% chance of
surviving. Damage to bone marrow and to the gastrointestinal tract could be expected. Though
unlikely that they would die, residents within seven miles might experience nausea and similar
symptoms. An increase in deaths in the next thirty years from cancer is likely among those
persons within a range of sixty miles from the reactor site. Even those living over 200 miles
from Chernobyl will have an increased likelihood of getting cancer due to the accident. Deadly
Meltdown, supra note 2, at 42.
11. Serrill, supra note 2, at 26. This report conflicts with a pronouncement from the
Soviet Union that only two people were killed during the explosion and that, of the 299 people
hospitalized, only seven had died. Mikhail Gorbachev's Television Address Concerning
Chernobyl Accident, SOVIET LIFE, July 1986, at 38.
12. Marbach, supra note 7, at 26. The purpose of the solution was to keep the children's
bodies from absorbing the element in radioactive form. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 44.
13. Marbach, supra note 7, at 26. Polish officials stated that a sharp increase in cancer
rates in the next two to three decades could be expected as a result of the mishap. Deadly
Meltdown, supra note 2, at 43.
14. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 44.
15. Serrill, supra note 2, at 28. In addition, 2.2 pounds of radioactive cesium fell upon
Sweden's neighbor, Norway. This figure represents 6% of the total discharge from the dam-
aged reactor. Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 31, 1987, at I-A, col. I.
16. Serrill, supra note 2, at 28.
17. The Foreign Office in Great Britain contemplated bringing international legal action
against the Soviet Union to recover the losses sustained by these farmers. Id. at 29.
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Chernobyl's effects were not confined to Europe. The world's
farmers and grocers were forced to check their produce with geiger
counters and to spray everything with water to remove any possible
contaminants.' Italy denied entrance into her country of thirty-two
freight cars loaded with cattle from Poland and Austria upon finding
that over 900 of the animals contained abnormally-high radiation
levels. 19 Due to the essentially unknown long-term effects of radia-
tion contamination on both people and the environment, "[iut will be
decades before all the effects of the world's worst nuclear reactor
accident are known." 20
This Comment will examine the nuclear reactor accident at
Chernobyl and its legal consequences in the international arena. In
examining these consequences, several important doctrines of inter-
national law will be discussed. Foremost among these is the doctrine
of territorial sovereignty. That is, while the Soviet Union may claim
the right to produce nuclear energy without interference from other
states, those other states have a reciprocal right to be free from in-
jury at the hands of the Soviet Union.
A state injured by radiation will first have to prove that the
Soviet Union was responsible for the accident. According to the doc-
trine of state responsibility, there is a concomitant duty of repara-
tion. An injured state must then prove the Soviet Union liable under
international law for the damage sustained.
Proving liability may be difficult, depending upon which of the
many theories a victim state chooses to assert. The arsenal of theo-
ries includes negligence, enterprise liability, strict liability, trespass,
and nuisance. A theory must be chosen in light of the type of remedy
it affords. Traditional remedies include compensation and injunction.
The above-outlined procedure is complex and difficult to admin-
ister. One impediment to the implementation of this procedure is
that injured nations rarely agree to submit their claims to an inter-
national tribunal for adjudication. Furthermore, the few decisions in
the environmental protection area have been made on an ad hoc ba-
sis, and provide relatively little guidance for members of the interna-
tional community. In an effort to eliminate these impediments, sev-
eral nations are executing bilateral or multilateral agreements.
This Comment proposes that a multinational treaty dealing with
environmental pollution is the optimum solution to the problem.
Such a document would set standards which would be acceptable to
18. More Fallout, supra note 4, at 44-45.
19. Id. at 44. In Tokyo, radiation was discovered in both rainwater and fresh milk. In
the United States, "[mlinute amounts of radiation were detected from the Pacific northwest to
upstate New York." id. at 45.
20. Serrill, supra note 2, at 29.
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the general international community. In this way, both offending and
victim states would be aware of their rights and obligations under
international law.
II. State Sovereignty
Professor Philip C. Jessup has stated that "[s]overeignty, in its
meaning of an absolute, uncontrolled state will, . . . is the quicksand
upon which the foundations of traditional international law are
built. 12 1 According to the doctrine of territorial sovereignty, states
exercise supreme and total jurisdiction over their territory. 22 This
includes the power to develop all branches of state government with-
out external interference. 23 Thus, no state may interfere with the
Soviet Union's power to regulate and control its own nuclear energy
industry.
The Permanent Court of International Arbitration (PCIA) con-
sidered the doctrine of territorial sovereignty to be a basic tenet of
international law in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case.", The
Court concluded that sovereignty is essentially territorial and that
the exercise of sovereignty, consequently, is limited to a state's
boundaries.2 While this may appear restrictive, it should be noted
that this concept carries with it the corresponding right of noninter-
ference within a state's territorial limits.2
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) reached the same con-
clusion as the PCIA in the Corfu Channel Case. 27 The ICJ rejected
Great Britain's argument that the Allies' minesweeping operation
21. P. JESSUP. A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 2 (1948). Sovereignty has been given many
different meanings. Hobbes viewed sovereignty is an absolutely unlimited legal power - not
only over all persons and things within the sovereign's territory but also over the state's rela-
tion with other states or their nationals. The sole restraint was that imposed by a state's own
will. A. LAWSON, SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 375 (1965).
22. MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 316 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968) [hereinafter
MANUAL]. See B. JANKOVIC, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1984).
23. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 316. See also UN Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35, 43 (I. Brownlie ed. 1983) (stating
that the territorial integrity and political independence of the state are inviolable) [hereinafter
BASIC DOCUMENTS].
24. North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.) Permanent Court of Arbitration,
I1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 167, 180 (1910) (in dispute over fishing rights in waters near New-
foundland, held that an interpretation of the 1783 Treaty of Peace between the two nations
favored the rights of the United States to fish in those waters).
25. Id.
26. A. LAWSON, supra note 21, at 376.
27. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. AIb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Merits) [hereinafter Corfu Chan-
nel Case]. British warships attempted to make an innocent passage through the Corfu Chan-
nel. Before doing so, however, the Allied forces conducted a minesweeping operation. When
the ships finally passed through, mines exploded, severely injuring crewmen and damaging the
ships. The Court held Albania liable for damages.
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constituted self-protection. 18 The Court stated that, between inde-
pendent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foun-
dation of international relations. 9
Article I of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States"0 crystallized this principle of international law. This resolu-
tion provides that "[e]very State has the sovereign and inalienable
right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and
cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without
outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever." '
Thus, it follows that a nation's right to choose nuclear power as a
source of energy falls within the breadth of the resolution.
The scope of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty is an issue
which has been adjudicated by several tribunals. In the Case of the
S.S. Lotus,32 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
concluded that restrictions upon the independence of states cannot
be presumed. as The Tribunal de Paris, in the Lake Lanoux Arbitra-
tion3 4 supported a decision made by France to divert river waters
and to compensate Spain for any damage sustained. Only France
could determine the utility of public works to be used on French
territory, according to the Tribunal de Paris.35 This was an affirma-
tion of France's right to territorial sovereignty.
The doctrine of territorial sovereignty applies to the situation
under current discussion. The Soviet Union was in the process of
developing its domestic nuclear energy industry when the accident
occurred at Chernobyl. Though international law authorizes the So-
viet Union to exercise sovereignty over its territory, it is clear that
territorial supremacy does not give a boundless liberty of action. 36
According to the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty, it is the
right of every nation to be free from outside interference, in making
and enforcing rules respecting all activity within its territory, but it
is also the obligation of every state to respect the rights of its neigh-
28. Id.
29. Id., cited in A. LAWSON, supra note 21, at 376.
30. U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
31. Id. at _ .
32. Case of the S.S. Lotus, (Turk. v. Fr.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, reprinted in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 293 (H. Steiner & D. Vagts eds. 1986). In 1926, a colli-
sion occurred between the French steamer Lotus and a Turkish collier. The accident occurred
about five nautical miles off the coast of Turkey. Consequently, it was considered to have taken
place on the high seas rather than within Turkey's territorial waters. The Turkish ship sank
and eight Turkish nationals perished.
33. Id. at 294.
34. France v. Spain, 24 I.L.R. 101 (Trib. de Paris 1957).
35. Id. at _ .
36. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (1966) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES]. Professor Brownlie notes that the law may prescribe the payment of compensa-
tion for the consequences of legal or "excusable" acts, and it is proper to consider this aspect
in connection with responsibility in general. Id. at 354.
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bors. 7 Accordingly, a state must not act in a manner detrimental to
another state but rather in good faith compliance with its interna-
tional obligations.38
One of the international obligations of a state is that it must
refrain from altering the natural conditions of its territory to the dis-
advantage of the natural conditions in the territory of a neighboring
state.3 9 Another obligation is set forth in Article I of the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty. 40 This multilateral agreement provides that
each party renounces the right to explode nuclear devices not
only 'at any place under its jurisdiction or control' . . . but also
. . . in any other environment if such explosion causes radioac-
tive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State
under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is
conducted.
41
The doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty encompasses some of
the elements of the theory of state responsibility.
III. State Responsibility
A. Background
Responsibility is a general principle of international law.' 2 Pro-
fessor Ian Brownlie has defined it as "a concomitant of substantive
rules and of the supposition that acts and omissions may be catego-
rized as illegal by reference to the rules establishing rights and du-
ties." 48 International law applies an objective test to determine
responsibility.
4'
37. Pickering, Swets, Who'll Stop The Rain. Resolution Mechanisms for U.S.-Cana-
dian Transboundary Pollution Disputes, 12 DEN. J. INTI' L. 51, 52 (1982). The Corfu Chan-
nel Case also supports the application of limited territorial sovereignty in an environmental
context: "It is every state's obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts
contrary to other states." Id. at 53. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 316.
39. Comment, Our Neighbor's Keeper? The U.S. and Canada: Coping With Trans-
boundary Pollution, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 159, 176 (1985-86) [hereinafter Our Neighbor's
Keeper?].
40. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Aug. 5, 1963, United States-United Kingdom-Soviet
Union, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 5433.
41. Id. at art. 1.
42. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 316-17. "State responsibility" embraces the concept that
"the authority of a state over its subjects is not confined to its territory, but extends beyond it,
provided its exercise does not infringe the territorial sovereignty of another state." Id. at 317.
43. PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, at 353-54. Brownlie further notes a distinction between
"original" and "vicarious" responsibility. "Original" responsibility flows from acts committed
by, or with the authorization of, the government of a state. "Vicarious" responsibility flows
from unauthorized acts committed by either the agents of a state or its nationals. Id. at 357-
58.
44. Id. at 357. It is important to distinguish between liability and responsibility. A state
may not necessarily be liable for an act even if it is held to be responsible for that act. The
term "liability" carries with it a certain immediacy or directness of legal obligation. It conveys
the idea of actual subjection of one person to a power recognized by law in another person.
The term "responsibility," on the other hand, refers to a pre-existing state of events not neces-
[Vol. 5:2
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Objective responsibility rests on the voluntariness of the act.4 5
Once agency and a causal link are established, a breach of duty oc-
curs by result alone. 46 Responsibility can flow from a state's execu-
tion of lawful measures.'17 The state may be at fault, therefore, based
upon either reasonable foreseeability or foresight without regard to
the consequences. 8
The doctrine of state responsibility traditionally has been used
as a vehicle by injured nations to justify their claims in international
environmental disputes. 49 This doctrine was crystallized in Principle
21 of the 1972 UN Declaration on the Human Environment:
States have, in accordance with the charter of the UN and the
principles of international law . . . the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction. 50
Furthermore, there has been general recognition of the rule that
a state may not permit the use of its territory for purposes injurious
to the interests of other states in a manner contrary to international
law.5 1 Professor Lassa Oppenheim even suggested that international
law imposes a duty upon every state, as far as possible, to prevent its
own subjects from committing injurious acts against other states.52
In addition, the Helsinki Final Act 53 noted that states have the duty
to ensure that their internal activities have no external environmen-
tal repercussions. "
sarily connected with the conduct causing harm, and at a stage removed from liability. A
person who is "responsible" by reason of such pre-existing condition could also be made "'lia-
ble." A person could not be made "liable" if he or she were not "responsible." Pinto, Reflec-
tions on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohib-
ited by International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 16, 26 (1985).
45. Principles, supra note 36, at 357.
46. Id., at 357-58. Defenses may be available, but the injuring state has the burden of
exonerating itself. Id. at 358.
47. Id. at 362.
48. The latter reason is often referred to as recklessness, or culpa lata. Id. at 361.
49. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 316. See B. JANKOVIC, supra note 22, at 117.
50. U.N. Doc. A/C48/14 (1974), reprinted in I I I.L.M. 1416 (1972). This statement is
repeated in paragraph 30 of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. See
BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 23, at 251.
51. Williams, Public International Law and Water Quality Management in a Common
Drainage Basin: The Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155, 170 (1986). This recogni-
tion may be due to the acceptance of the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your
land in a manner so as not to harm another) as a general principle of international law. Id. at
170. The United Nations has approved of this principle. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Rev. 1
(1949). See also Rosencranz, The International Law and Politics of Acid Rain, 10 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y. 511, 513 (1981).
52. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (1948).
53. Reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1292, 1307 (1972).
54. The official text states that " . . . each of the participating States, in accordance
with the principles of international law, ought to ensure . . . that activities carried out on its
territory do not cause degradation of the environment of another State or in areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction." Id.
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B. The Corfu Channel Rule
In the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ specifically held that Alba-
nia had an obligation to warn the British fleet of the existence of a
mine field in the channel.5 5 In its decision, the Court announced the
following rule: "[E]very state has an obligation to not knowingly al-
low its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states [.16 This principle can be applied to the Chernobyl incident.
Under the rule announced in the Corfu Channel Case, a coun-
try that wants to hold the Soviet Union responsible for the radiation
damages caused by the fallout from the Chernobyl blast must prove
two elements. First, the nation must show that the nuclear accident
was an act that was contrary to the rights of other states. Second, it
must be shown that the Soviet Union knowingly allowed its territory
to be used in such a manner.
In order to determine whether the Chernobyl accident satisfies
the first criterion - the use of territory contrary to the rights of
other states - it is helpful to examine previous cases and documents
that have dealt with the subject of pollution. In the seminal Trail
Smelter Arbitration,5 7 the tribunal relied on principles of interna-
tional law and the law of the United States.58 It concluded that no
state has a right to use or permit the use of its territory in a manner
that would cause injury by fumes to another territory.59 The arbitra-
tors held that Canada was responsible under international law for
the actions of the smelter, even though the smelter was owned and
operated by a private corporation."
In the French Nuclear Tests Case,61 the ICJ applied the doc-
55. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 27, at 22.
56. id.
57. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), Hague Ct. Rep., 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1905 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion]. In this case, fumes and smoke from a copper smelter located in Trail, British Columbia,
drifted into the state of Washington, causing extensive damage.
58. Id. at 716. The tribunal also stressed that an "injured" state's claim that its rights
are being invaded must be of a serious magnitude and must be established by clear and con-
vincing evidence before the tribunal would exercise its extraordinary power to control the con-
duct of one state at the request of the injured state. Id. at 715 (quoting New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921)). Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice permits an international adjudicatory body to apply the municipal law of civilized na-
tions to determine the outcome of international disputes.
59. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 57, at 716.
60. Id. at 717. This follows from the premise that certain conditions exist in the territory
of a state which guarantee the safety of both persons and property. States are obligated, there-
fore, not to pollute or cause serious damage to the air of an adjoining state. Williams, supra
note 51, at 158. Damage to other states from Chernobyl affected not only the air but also the
physical territory. See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text.
61. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.) (Judgment), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (where France had
ceased conducting unauthorized nuclear tests which were causing fallout to appear in Austra-
lian airspace, held that Australia no longer had a claim because it was no longer being
harmed) [hereinafter Nuclear Tests Case].
[Vol. 5:2
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trines of territorial sovereignty and international responsibility. 2 Im-
plicit in the Court's decision was the finding that a state has an obli-
gation to repair the damage caused by an offense committed within
its jurisdiction."' The Court also noted that this responsibility could
be based upon either treaty or custom.6
One such custom has been illustrated by the Stockholm Decla-
ration.65 The Sixth Principle of the Declaration is applicable to the
current situation insofar as it recognizes that the discharge of toxic
substances and the release of heat in large quantities is detrimental
to the environment and must be halted.6 6 This is consistent with the
generally-accepted principle that each state is responsible for con-
fronting the environmental problem of air pollution."7
The Trail Smelter Arbitration and the Nuclear Tests Case sup-
port the proposition that pollution which causes damage in another
country is contrary to the rights of that country. In addition, the
Sixth Principle of the Stockholm Declaration can be cited as author-
ity, since radioactive material certainly must qualify as a "toxic sub-
stance," the dispersion of which is detrimental to the environment.
An injured state in the Chernobyl situation, therefore, would be able
to satisfy the first requirement of the Corfu Channel test. The sec-
ond requirement to be proven is "knowledge."
Since the decision in the Corfu Channel Case, international
scholars have concluded that either actual or implied knowledge 6 is
sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the Corfu Channel test. In
that case, the basis for the finding of responsibility was Albania's
knowledge of the laying of the mines. The court relied on circum-
stantial evidence to establish this knowledge. 9
The fact that circumstantial evidence was used does not alter
the requirement that knowledge is a necessary predicate to responsi-
bility.70 In the situation under current discussion, circumstantial evi-
62. Id. at 256. See Our Neighbor's Keeper?, supra note 39, at 173.
63. Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 61, at 256.
64. Id.
65. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doec. A/Conf.
48/14; III I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
66. Id. at 1418.
67. Comment, Acid Rain, 6 Hous. J. INT'L L. 197, 209 (1983-84) [hereinafter Acid
Rain].
68. The doctrine of international responsibility includes responsibility for conditions of
which a state may have only imputed knowledge. Our Neighbor's Keeper?, supra note 39, at
175.
69. The Court considered whether it had been established by means of indirect evidence
that Albania had knowledge of the mine-laying expedition in its territorial waters. It concluded
that the laying of the minefield could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of
the Albanian Government. PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, at 360.
70. Id. It is true that a state on whose territory an act contrary to international law has
occurred may be called upon to give an explanation. That state may not claim ignorance of the
action. It is not to be concluded from the mere fact of a state's control over its territory,
however, that the state necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of the act of its authors.
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dence may be used to demonstrate the Soviet Union's knowledge.
The test that was conducted on the reactor on April 25, 1986 was
not the first of such experiments.7 1 The Soviet Government was
aware of the frequent use of such tests and approved of them.
72
Thus, a state injured by radioactive fallout from Chernobyl will
be able to prove both the use of Soviet territory in a manner con-
trary to the rights of other states and the Soviet Union's knowledge
of such use. Consequently, such a state can claim that the Soviet
Union should be held responsible for the accident at Chernobyl.
Even if a nation does not allege the criteria enumerated under the
preceding test, international law provides other ways in which re-
sponsibility may be proven.
C. Culpable Negligence
A second test which has developed in the international law of
state responsibility is comprised of three elements. First, there must
be an act or omission that violates an obligation established by a rule
of international law in force between the state responsible for the act
or omission and the injured state. Second, the unlawful act must be
imputable to the injuring nation. Finally, the injured country must
have suffered loss or damage due to that unlawful act.7 s Further-
more, Professor Oppenheim has stated that "an act of a state injuri-
ous to another state is . . .not an international delinquency if com-
mitted neither willfully and maliciously nor with culpable
negligence.
'7 4
The mishap at Chernobyl was clearly an accident; it was com-
DECISIONS OF THE I.C.J.: A DIGEST 24 (J. Syatauw ed. 1969).
71. The test was devised by an electro-technical institute and was directed by electrical
engineers. A similar test had been performed successfully on two other Chernobyl reactors.
One year prior to this test, the same test did not prove successful on Unit 4 because the
generator failed to provide enough power. Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1986, at A34, col. I.
72. Id.
73. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 534. See also B. JANKOVIC, supra note 22, at 151.
Article 3 of the draft articles provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission
states this test in a similar manner: "There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when:
(a) Conduct consisting of an action or an omission is attributable to the State under interna-
tional law; and (b) That conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State." 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 179 (1973), reprinted in 1. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 30 (1983) [hereinafter STATE RESPONSIBILITY]. The In-
ternational Law Commission is a body of 34 international lawyers elected by the United Na-
tions General Assembly. The function of the Commission is to codify and progressively develop
international law. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 33
(1984).
74. A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 131 (1983). This view has
considerable support in the environmental field. For example, the 1948 frontier treaty between
Poland and the USSR requires compensation only if material damage is caused to one party
through the fault of the other party. Fault was defined as the failure of one state to take steps
to prevent deliberate destruction on the banks of frontier rivers and lakes. See THE PROTEC-
TION OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 4475 (B. Ruster &
B. Simma eds. 1958).
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mitted with neither willfulness nor malice. This determination, how-
ever, does not dispose of the issue, since the accident may have been
the result of culpable negligence. Indeed, Soviet officials blamed the
accident primarily on "gross violations of operating regulations by
the workers."' 75 In addition, both the international community and
the Soviet Union itself have criticized several design and structural
defects of the reactor model. 6
The Chernobyl unit lacked the type of protective containment
building common to most American reactors. 17 It also contained de-
sign features dating back as far as 1942. 78 Even Soviet writers criti-
cized the shoddy building practices and workmanship of nuclear re-
actors in their country generally as well as deficiencies in the quality
of construction of the Chernobyl plant in particular. 79 Indeed, if
these criticisms are well-founded, then the Soviet Union undoubtedly
committed an act of culpable negligence by not correcting the situa-
tion. Culpable negligence also may be found in the Soviet Union's
failure to upgrade the reactor unit. Since modern nuclear reactors
begin to lose power when their coolant fluids overheat, 80 the
Chernobyl unit needed upgrading because it did not contain such a
feature.81 Furthermore, the 1700 tubes carrying radioactive materi-
als away from the core of the reactor were not enclosed within the
customary reinforced safety structure in the unit. 82 This created a
hazardous situation because, if any pipe ruptured, the radioactive
contents would be released into the atmosphere immediately.8"
Clearly, the Chernobyl unit did not contain appropriate safety
features.
Assuming that the various acts and omissions by the Soviet au-
thorities constituted international delinquencies on grounds of culpa-
ble negligence, an injured country next must prove that these acts
75. Serrill, supra note 2, at 26. One report related that the staff at the Chernobyl plant
was determined to go ahead with the test "at all costs," despite increasingly apparent risks.
Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1986, at A34, col. 1.
76. The Soviet Government admitted that reactor design flaws, as well as human error,
contributed to the disaster. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1986, at A20, col. I.
77. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 40.
78. Id. at 49. The Chernobyl reactor's model, the RBMK-1000, was outdated and had
not been changed in over thirty years. Id. See also Gauging the Fallout from Chernobyl, 117
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 44, 45 (1986) (stating that the reactor's design was "obsolete").
79. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 50.
80. Raloff, More Details on Chernobyl, SCIENCE NEWS, May 24, 1986, at 326. The
article does not mention whether this is an automatic response or is one that may be blocked,
as in the case of Chernobyl.
81. The Chernobyl unit incorporated what is known as "positive void coefficient." This
means that any loss of water or overheating of the water could spark a surge in the fission
action, causing reactor power to increase. Raloff, A Meltdown But No Melt-through, SCIENCE
NEWS, May 17, 1986, at 308 [hereinafter A Meltdown But No Melt-through].
82. Id.
83. Id. For a general discussion of proposed modifications to other reactors of the same
type, see Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1986, at A34, col. 4.
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and omissions were imputable to the Soviet Union. There are several
ways in which international delinquencies may be attributed to a
specific state. In general, a state cannot be held responsible for the
actions of private individuals over whom it has no control. 84 Profes-
sor Brownlie has stated that "responsibility can only be based upon
some ultimate default by the organs of a state, the activities of pri-
vate persons merely constituting the objective conditions which give
rise to a breach of a principle, or standard, of general international
law . . . on the part of that state." 85
Judge Hersch Lauterpacht has enunciated the same principle. 6
He contends that a state bears full responsibility for breaches of in-
ternational law committed by any of its servants - officials, courts,
and armed forces 87 - but not by private parties. Thus, before an
injured country may'prove that the actions which caused the acci-
dent at Chernobyl are imputable to the Soviet Union, it must
demonstrate that a breach of international law was committed by an
organ of that state."
Several government agencies regulate the safety, construction,
and operation of nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union." These
agencies played an important role in the Chernobyl accident.90 The
test that led to the meltdown should have been supervised, or at least
authorized, by an official from one of the regulatory agencies.
Reports have stated, however, that the test plan had not been
studied by the plant's safety review group and that the test was con-
ducted without proper authorization. 91 The agencies responsible for
review and supervision did not fulfill their duties. Since these agen-
84. Williams, supra note 51, at 158. " ... [M]uch of the human activity that gives rise
to detrimental environmental effects of concern to the international community is carried on
by private persons for whose actions the state is not normally directly responsible." A.
SPRINGER, supra note 74, at 128. See also STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 73, at 159.
85. STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 73, at 159.
86. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOLUME I 399 (1970).
87. Id. at 400. This principle is further demonstrated by the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. The International Law Commission concluded that acts or omissions imputable
to the state would include those of state organs belonging either to the legislative, executive,
judicial, or other branch of the government, provided that the organ was acting in that capac-
ity in the case in question. Williams, supra note 51, at 159.
88. A state which substantially affects other states by emanations from within its bor-
ders, such as nuclear tests, fumes, air or water pollution, or diversion of waters, is interfering
with the rights of the other, for it is the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the
injured state that is infringed. The acting state is in breach of the duty of noninterference
established by customary international law, generally stated in the maxim: sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 540. See also supra note 51.
89. For a general discussion of the USSR's nuclear energy industry, see Semenov, Nu-
clear Power in the Soviet Union, 25 IAEA BULL. 47 (1986).
90. The "Gosgortekhnadza of the USSR" supervises compliance with regulations and
standards of engineering safety in design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
The "Gosatmnadzor of the USSR" supervises compliance with rules and standards of nuclear
safety in design, construction and operation of the plants. Id. at 53.
91. Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1986, at A34, col. 1.
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cies are organs of the state, their inaction is imputable to the Soviet
Union. This conclusion is supported by the highly-accepted view that
"a state will be responsible where its officials have failed to act dili-
gently and have not prevented the acts of private individuals which
have caused environmental damage abroad. ' 2
D. Unwillingness to Punish
Responsibility may arise in international law in yet another
manner. For example, suppose an accident that occurs in Country A
causes damage to property in Country B. Assume further that the
accident was caused by private individuals in Country A over whom
the government of Country A exerted no direct control. The accident
was not foreseeable and no organ of the state was involved. Further-
more, the incident involved no culpable negligence on the part of
Country A. If Country A failed to prosecute those persons responsi-
ble for causing the accident, that state would become responsible
under international law. This is so even where Country A could not
be held liable" for the actual injury.94
In the Chernobyl situation, the Soviet Union initiated criminal
proceedings against the persons involved in the accident and expelled
the plant's former director.95 Top Soviet nuclear power officials were
fired and twenty-seven Communist Party members were expelled
from the Party.9 Thus, an injured state probably would not be suc-
cessful in arguing that the USSR exhibited an unwillingness to pun-
ish those nationals who contributed to the causing of the accident.
Though such punitive measures may have provided a deterrent ef-
fect, they cannot serve to exonerate the Soviet Union from liability.
IV. Liability
"Liability" in international law is distinguishable from "respon-
sibility.' 7 The International Law Commission has suggested that
the term "responsibility" should be used only in connection with in-
ternationally wrongful acts.98 The term "liability," on the other
hand, should be used when referring to the possible injurious conse-
quences arising out of the performance of certain lawful activities.99
The practical effect, however, is that liability attaches only to per-
92. Williams, supra note 51, at 159.
93. See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference between
liability and responsibility.
94. Williams, supra note 51, at 159.
95. Chernobyl's Goats, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 33.
96. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
97. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
98. Preliminary Report, A/CN.4/334, par. 10, 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 211 (1973).
99. Id.
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sons who are legally responsible.100
In international law, the principle of liability functions to sub-
ject an individual or a state to either bear or contribute to the costs
of the consequences arising from existing harm. 10 1 Liability is as-
sessed to achieve the following goals: (i) internalization of the cost of
harm in one or more states; (ii) transfer of adequate compensation,
or other acts of reparation, from these states to the victim; (iii)
preventing repetition of the harm-causing conduct; and (iv) the
maintenance of safe conduct for the future.
1 0 2
The PCIJ applied the principle of liability in the Chorzow Fac-
tory Case.1 03 The Court there noted that the effect of a finding of
state responsibility in international law is that the offending state
must make reparation to the injured state. 04 This rule is consistent
with Principle 22 of the 1972 Declaration on the Human Environ-
ment, which provides that "[sltates shall cooperate to develop fur-
ther the international law regarding liability and compensation for
victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by ac-
tivities within the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas be-
yond their jurisdiction."'' 0 The form of reparation to which an in-
jured nation is entitled may vary, and will depend on the theory of
liability applicable under the circumstances.
A. Negligence (Liability Based on Fault)
A negligence theory' 06 has been proposed as "the most plausible
and promising route to substantial redress of injury."' 07 The decision
100. Id. For an example of a document in international law which encompasses both the
theory of liability and the theory of responsibility, see the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, G.A. Res. 2749.
101. Pinto, supra note 44, at 31.
102. Id.
103. Chorzow Factory Case (Indmenity) (Get. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17
(held, that reparations should be paid by the Polish Government to the German Government
for damage done to property in Germany's possession) [hereinafter Chorzow Factory Case].
104. The Court stated the general rule: "It is a principle of international law, and even a
general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation." Id. at 29.
105. I.L.M., supra note 50, at 1420.
106. Negligence, or fault, is the usual basis of liability under common law for tortious
conduct or for wrongful conduct that causes an injury and gives rise to a claim for damages. A
plaintiff suing on account of pollution damage on a negligence theory would have to show that
the alleged polluter had fallen short of the "reasonable man" standard of conduct, and that the
offender could have foreseen that his conduct might result in damage like that which has
occurred. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION, 19 (1974).
107. Mingst, Evaluating Public and Private Approaches to International Solutions to
Acid Rain Pollution, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 5, 18 (1982). This is in contrast to the view that
such a theory would prove insufficient in an international context because an industry need
only prove compliance with applicable government regulations to avoid liability for pollution
injury. Comment, Compensating Private Parties for Transnational Pollution Injury, 58 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 528, 552 (1984) [hereinafter Compensating Private Parties]. It has also been
argued that liability standards for governing state conduct in the control of pollution activities
are either nonexistent or expressed only in general terms. A. SPRINGER, supra note 74, at 131.
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in the Corfu Channel Case also reflects this negligence standard of
liability. The ICJ noted, however, that the mere accidental invasion
of another state's rights does not render the acting state liable. 108
In order for an injured country to recover under a negligence
theory, it must establish negligence before proving injury. °9 The vic-
tim state must demonstrate the following elements: (i) the acting
state failed to carry out a legally recognized duty, the breach of
which resulted in damage to the claimant state, (ii) the acting state
carelessly impinged on the claimant state's unalterable rights, and
(iii) a causal link exists between the offending state's action and the
injury sustained by the claimant state. 10 It follows, then, that a state
injured by the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl has a viable claim
in negligence.
First, the Soviet Union breached the duty of noninterference
with the rights of other nations as established by the maxim of cus-
tomary international law sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas."'
Second, it is clear that the USSR carelessly impinged on the rights
of the countries sustaining damage from the fallout. As has been
noted earlier, the Soviet Union failed to inspect the test plan, work-
ers at the plant violated operating and safety standards, and design
and structural defects contributed to the accident." 12 Finally, there is
little doubt that the radiation contamination in several states was
caused by the Chernobyl accident. An injured country, however, will
be confronted with the traditional proof problems associated with
causation when bringing an action against the USSR for compensa-
tion because any increase in cancer or other health concerns proba-
bly will go unnoticed for many years." 3 The contamination of milk,
water, vegetables, and animals, on the other hand, can be readily
tested and measured, making immediate compensation possible for
these damages.
In the case of Chernobyl, however, this would not be a barrier to recovery because workers
violated protocols and, therefore, were not in compliance with government regulations. Serrill,
supra note 2, at 26. It has also been suggested that the burden of proof regarding negligence
should be shifted to the alleged polluter, requiring a demonstration of due diligence. A.
SPRINGER, supra note 74, at 131. See also Corfu Channel Case, supra note 27, at 46 (individ-
ual opinion of Alvarez, J.).
108. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 27, at 18. A state's liability for accidental damage
will depend on proof that the state's lack of due care or due diligence brought about the
transnationally injurious event. Handl, International Liability of States for Marine Pollution,
21 CAN. Y.B. IN'L L. 85, 95 (1983) [hereinafter International Liability].
109. Mingst, supra note 107, at 18.
110. Id.
Ill. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 540.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 88, and 89, respectively.
113. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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B. Enterprise Liability
It has been suggested that a rule of enterprise liability should be
implemented to redress injury caused by geographically diffused pol-
lution.""4 Enterprise liability is applicable to in those situations
where multiple offenders have engaged in some type of industry-wide
cooperation 15 by which they can be considered to have "jointly con-
trolled the risk." 116 Under this theory, each member of the industry
would be held liable if any damage resulting from its operations oc-
curs.117 Although this theory may be inappropriate under the present
circumstances, it may become more useful as nuclear power plants
proliferate.
The mechanics of this theory were demonstrated in Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories."8 In Sindell, the plaintiff was unable to prove
which one of five pharmaceutical companies produced the drug that
was responsible for causing her injuries.1" 9 She was permitted, never-
theless, to recover from those companies that were unable to prove
that they did not manufacture that particular drug.120 The court
noted that the unavailability of proof was not the fault of the plain-
tiff, but rather it was due to the fact that the defendants produced a
drug whose effects were not visible for many years.
121
The facts of the Sindell case may be altered slightly to demon-
strate how the theory of enterprise liability applies to the current
situation. Suppose another nuclear reactor accident occurred within
the five years after the accident at Chernobyl. A plaintiff who then
exhibits signs of cancer due to overexposure to radiation would be
unable to prove the source of contamination. That person, then,
would be in the same position as the plaintiff in Sindell.
In Sindell, the burden of proof was shifted to the defendants to
exonerate themselves. The court ruled that the manufacturers should
be held jointly and severally liable for the whole of the plaintiff's
injuries if unable to exonerate themselves because manufacturers are
114. Compensating Private Parties, supra note 107, at 553.
115. The term "industry-wide" liability is also used to express this theory. See Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 598, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1980).
116. Id. at 608, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
117. Id.
118. 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice permits the "municipal law of civilised nations" to be
applied to resolve international disputes.
119. Sindell, 26 Cal.3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. When a party
cannot identify which of two or more defendants caused an injury, the "alternative liability"
theory provides that the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show that they were not
responsible for the harm. Id. See also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 103
(Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
120. Sindell, 26 Cal.3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
121. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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better able to discover and prevent defects. 2 ' This ruling was
designed to send a signal to manufacturers and producers to install
or develop adequate safeguards for their particular operations. 1 3
Applying this reasoning to the nuclear power industry, an enter-
prise liability theory would encourage those states manufacturing
nuclear power.to maintain or install safety mechanisms. If such a
theory were currently practicable, the Soviet Union would have the
burden of proving that it did not cause the injuries sustained by
other states as a result of the accident.
C. Strict Liability
The trend in international law is away from a fault, or negli-
gence, standard and toward a standard of strict liability." 4 The rul-
ings in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,2 5 the Corfu Channel Case,""
and the Lake Lanoux Arbitration'2 7 point to the emergence of strict
liability as a principle of public international law.' 28 These cases sup-
port the basic principle that a state is responsible for all activities
taking place within its territory and may be held liable if damage to
the interests of other states reaches a pollution threshold, even if the
state has done all it could to prevent the damage.'29
Under the doctrine of strict liability, the offending state is obli-
gated to compensate the injured state for all damage that is the nat-
ural result of its activity, regardless of a finding that the offending
state exercised due care.130 International law scholars and practition-
122. Id.
123. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 119, at 681-710. This theory especially would be
applicable as well to the chemical spills into the Rhine River in November 1986. See Kiss, The
Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 613 (1985).
124. A. SPRINGER, supra note 74, at 132. This is demonstrated by such works as the
International Law Association's rules governing international waterways, and the Helsinki
Rules of 1966. Strict liability has been the relevant standard in some international agreements
dating back to the 1920s. For example, a 1922 treaty between Germany and Denmark requires
any persons suffering prejudice to be compensated for their loss. Also, Article V of the 1964
frontier agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union mandates reparation for any dam-
age resulting from measures taken by either of the parties. This agreement focuses on the
harmful consequences, and not on the illegality, of the action. Id. Another author postulates
that strict liability may soon become the accepted norm with regard to liability. Williams,
supra note 51, at 161.
125. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
128. These cases contain judicial recognition of the applicability in international law of
such related common-law principles as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas and good neighbor-
liness. A. SPRINGER, supra note 74, at 133-34.
129. Id. at 134. Where a state fails to comply with specific international pollutant emis-
sion or discharge standards, there can be no doubt about state responsibility. Handl, Liability
as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L.
49, 57 (1985) [hereinafter Liability as an Obligation].
130. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 106, at 19-20. Under this theory, the of-
fending state would have the burden of exculpation. See STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
73, at I.
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ers distinguish two "types" of strict liability: strict liability without
regard to fault, and strict liability based on abnormally dangerous
activities. 13' Under either of these types, the Soviet Union would be
obligated to compensate the injured countries for the damage they
sustained as a result of the Chernobyl accident.
13 2
1. Strict Liability without regard to fault.-A fundamental
distinguishing feature of the class of cases of this type is the "acci-
dental" nature of the harm inflicted. 33 The doctrine of strict liability
pertains to accidents because the injury is most often the result of an
activity which "is not wrongful, but gives rise to liability even in the
absence of an allegation of negligence or fault."'
34
The 1969 Brussels Resolution on Establishment of an Interna-
tional Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage "5 applies this
type of strict liability. The Brussels Resolution provides for strict lia-
bility as the basis for determining compensation when a state has
been injured by an oil pollution incident.
13 6
Strict liability is the cornerstone of any international legal stan-
dard where the protection of the environment is concerned, espe-
cially with regard to accidental pollution.1 3 7 This standard provides a
very effective spur to accident prevention. 3 8 For example, the Soviet
Union after being criticized sharply for defects in the design of its
Chernobyl reactor, proposed several modifications. 3 9
2. Strict liability based on abnormally dangerous activi-
131. Regardless of this distinction, decisions and documents in international law reveal
uniformity as to what must be regarded as the critical parameters engaging liability. A (signif-
icant) accidental transnational harm must be: (1) due to the miscarriage of an activity that
carries a presumptively recognizable significant risk of transnational harm; (2) typical of the
risk associated with the activity; and (3) the result of a risk that is deemed significant, not in
the sense of the probability of its realization, but of the consequences foreseeably associated
with its realizations. Liability as an Obligation, supra note 129, at 69.
132. The Chernobyl incident demonstrates components of both types of strict liability. It
was an accident, which would seem to place it in the category of "strict liability without re-
gard to fault;" however, it was a nuclear reactor explosion, which usually falls under the cate-
gory of ultrahazardous activities.
133. Liability as an Obligation, supra note 129, at 64.
134. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 106, at 19.
135. Id. at 228.
136. The actual text states, "Victims should be fully and adequately compensated under
a system based upon the principle of strict liability." Id. at 229.
137. International Liability, supra note 108, at 87.
138. Goldie, Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability in Terms of Relative Exposure
to Risk, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 188 (1985). See also International Liability, supra note
108, at 98. A strict liability standard will allow industries and nations to weigh the benefit of a
polluting activity against the injury caused by such pollution. Compensating Private Parties,
supra note 107, at 553. One author proposes, however, that such a standard for transnational
accidents is plausible only when the magnitude of potential damage associated with a given
accident renders the risk-bearing activity a matter of international concern. International Lia-
bility, supra note 108, at 99.
139. See Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1986, at A34, col. 4.
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ties.-"Of greater significance in the development of doctrines of
strict liability are international agreements covering such particu-
larly hazardous activities as the maritime transport of large volumes
of oil, space exploration, and the production and use of nuclear en-
ergy." '10 The thrust of these agreements is to prevent a state which
creates a risk on its territory from passing that risk onto the
public.
1 4 1
Several treaties already provide that a party which engages in
certain hazardous activities1 42 will be strictly liable for any accidents
that cause another party to sustain damage. 43 The 1969 Brussels
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships'44 demon-
strates an application of this type of liability. This Convention states
that "[tihe operator of a nuclear ship shall be absolutely liable for
any nuclear damage[.]" 145 Likewise, under the Convention on Inter-
national Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,'" the
launching state is absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object.
1 47
The Soviet Union's nuclear power industry is clearly within the
class of ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities. The the-
ory of strict liability, thus, is applicable to the Chernobyl incident.
According to such documents as the 1969 Brussels Convention and
the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 148
the liability of the Soviet Union for the nuclear damage from
Chernobyl should be absolute.
140. A. SPRINGER, supra note 74, at 133. In addition to its inclusion in international
agreements, the creation of unlimited liability has been passed as law in West Germany. Un-
limited Liability for Nuclear Power Plants? INT'L Bus. LAw 386 (1985).
141. A. SPRINGER, supra note 74, at 133. The approach normally taken is to "channel"
liability back to the party engaged in the risk-creating activity, "no matter how long the chain
of causation, nor how novel the intervening factors." Id. This idea has burgeoned into the
principle of liability for "the created risk." it implies that one who, for his pleasure or profit,
introduces a dangerous thing into society becomes liable for any accident arising from it. Since
this could paralyze initiative, it is important that this theory be implemented with a compul-
sory insurance program, or with a ceiling of liability. There is also some question as to whether
the placement of nuclear activity is a created risk or a lawful act triggering state responsibility
principles. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 538-40.
142. An example of special importance in international law is the application of the
doctrine of strict liability to operators or agencies responsible for the manufacture, transporta-
tion, or use of radioactive materials, and to activities that may result in injuries in the form of
pollution by radiation. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 106, at 20.
143. In this situation, the offending state must compensate the injured state for all dam-
age which is the natural result of the activity, regardless of a finding of due care. Id.
144. Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962,
reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1968).
145. Id. at 269.
146. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Sept.
I, 1972, 10 I.L.M. 965 (1971).
147. Id. at 966.
148. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature
May 21, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 727.
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D. Trespass
Under a trespass theory of liability, the victim state is not re-
quired to demonstrate actual injury. Instead, it need only prove that
there has been an intrusion upon protected interests by either visible
or invisible "pieces of matter or by energy."1 9 States are attracted
to this theory due to the insubstantial burden of proof required.
A state which has suffered injury due to radiation contamina-
tion would have few problems stating a claim under trespass because
there are only two elements necessary to make out a claim. First, it
is indisputable that radioactive particles are "invisible pieces of mat-
ter." Second, the fact that exposure to radiation causes injury to
people and to the environment demonstrates an intrusion upon an-
other state's protected interests.
For all its attraction, however, there is a drawback to the use of
the trespass theory: the available remedies are unappealing. Though
an injunction may issue to prevent the acting nation from repeating
the harmful action, 150 this does little to compensate an injured coun-
try and its citizens for their losses. The Chernobyl incident is illus-
trative because the USSR shut down all reactors of the RBMK-1000
type.1 5t Hence, such an ex post facto remedy, in actuality, is no rem-
edy at all.
E. Nuisance
A nation injured by the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl
could choose to apply either the private or public nuisance theory.
The doctrine of "private nuisance" prohibits the unreasonable use of
one's property in such a way as to cause substantial interference with
the use and enjoyment by another of his own property. 1562 A requisite
element of this cause of action is proof of a wrongful act or omission
by the defendant which causes or permits the escape of a deleterious
substance onto the land of another. 53 A "deleterious substance" is
defined as gas, smoke, fumes, or germs.1 54 The radioactive emissions
from Chernobyl clearly would fall within the scope of this definition.
The applicability of a private nuisance theory depends, first,
upon the injured state's ability to pinpoint the source of the injury.
149. Mingst, supra note 107, at 18.
150. Compensation or redress cannot be obtained under trespass. Id. Remedies are dis-
cussed in greater detail below. See infra section V.
151. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 50.
152. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 106, at 20. "The plaintiff must show not
only that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the interference but also that the
defendant's conduct was either intentional or actionable under the rules governing liability for
negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct." Id.
153. Acid Rain, supra note 67, at 206.
154. Id.
155. Id. Two further conditions are that an interference "must be substantial and con-
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This theory has been rejected as inapplicable or ineffective because
the source of pollution in environmental cases is often disputed.
However, it is clear in the present situation that the pollution was
the direct result of the nuclear reactor fire and meltdown in the So-
viet Union. Therefore, proving the source of injury would not be a
barrier for a state damaged by fallout from Chernobyl.
To establish the liability of the USSR under private nuisance,
an injured nation must next prove that the Soviet Union's use of its
property to produce domestic nuclear energy was "unreasonable."
The satisfaction of this second element will be rather difficult. If an
injured state can prove that the production of nuclear energy was
undertaken in an unreasonable manner, or without proper regard for
safety features, it may be able to sustain its burden of proof with
regard to this element of the theory.1 56 As in trespass, even if a vic-
tim state proves all of the necessary elements, only injunctive relief is
available.
157
A public nuisance is different from its private counterpart in
that it is an interference with the right of the public at large.158 The
state of Washington effectively utilized the public nuisance theory in
the Trail Smelter Arbitration.'" Recovery was limited, however, to
"proven damage."' 160 For this reason, states often choose not to pro-
ceed under a nuisance theory. A claimant nation must show that the
injury is different in both kind and degree from that suffered by the
rest of the world. 6' A country located close to Chernobyl, therefore,
may be able to prove it was injured by radiation contamination to a
greater extent than was a state situated further away but may not
include any claims for health-related injuries that cannot be
''proven."
As has been shown, an injured country may choose from among
several theories of liability. Having examined the requisite elements
and applicability of each theory, it is also important to consider the
effects of a finding of liability under international law. This finding
should entitle an injured state to an appropriate remedy.
tinuing as affecting a person of ordinary sensibilities," and that only land rights are protected.
Mingst, supra note 107, at 17.
156. Acid Rain, supra note 67, at 206.
157. Id. It is important to note that the activity has interfered in the use or enjoyment of
property. This criterion was clearly met in the current situation. An injured state, however,
will not be able to recover for any health-related injuries under this theory. Id.
158. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 106, at 20.
159. The specific language is: "As between the two countries involved, each has an equal
interest that if a nuisance be proved, the indemnity to damaged parties for proven damage
shall be just and adequate and each has also an equal interest that unproven or unwarranted
claims shall not be allowed." Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 57, at 685.
160. Id.
161. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 106, at 21. Since few nations may be capa-
ble of meeting this burden of proof, it has been suggested that this theory would not further
the interests of pollution victims. Compensating Private Parties, supra note 107, at 533.
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V. Remedies
Professor Brownlie has listed several remedies available when a
state is found to have violated an obligation of international law. 162
Among these are the payment of compensation, " the taking of steps
to prevent a recurrence of the breach, the punishment of responsible
individuals, apology, and any other forms of satisfaction.""
A. Compensation
In the Chorzow Factory Case,'6" the PCIJ stated the general
rule to be applied with respect to compensation:
[Rieparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if that is not possible, pay-
ment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in
kind would bear; the award . . .of damages for loss sustained
which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in
place of it - such are the principles which should serve to de-
termine the amount of compensation due .... 166
In the case under present discussion, the consequences of the
Chernobyl accident could never be "wiped out.' 167 An injured state
has been permanently altered. Its environment has been contami-
nated. Its citizens have an increased risk of suffering from cancer.
Restitution in kind, therefore, is impossible in such a case since no
redress can be provided to make the victim state whole.
When restitution in kind is impossible, damages, in the form of
an indemnity, may then be awarded.1 68 This alternative was applied
in the Trail Smelter Arbitration'6 and in the Corfu Channel
Case.' There appears to be no reason why damages should not be
available in the immediate case to compensate the injured states for
162. STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 73, at 199.
163. Theoretically, tort law provides the remedies of damages and injunctions to those
injured as a result of pollution which can be traced to another's wrongful act or omission. Acid
Rain, supra note 67, at 206.
164. STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 73, at 199. This Comment will discuss only
the first two remedies listed.
165. Chorzow Factory Case, supra note 103.
166. Id. at 47. Restitution in kind is designed to re-establish the situation which would
have existed if the wrongful act or omission had not taken place by: (1) performance of the
obligation which the state failed to discharge; (2) revocation of the unlawful act; or (3) absten-
tion from further wrongful conduct. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 565.
167. Williams, supra note 51, at 161.
168. MANUAL, supra note 22, at 565-66. One author proposes that the usual type of
reparation for a wrongful act or omission is an indemnity that corresponds to the damage
suffered. Williams, supra note 51, at 161.
169. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 57, at 687.





Compensation in the form of damages is the best alternative af-
forded to a state injured by radiation contamination from Chernobyl.
An injunction, however, would be an invaluable remedy if the reac-
tor were reactivated without modification. 71 An injunction is a
means to prohibit a party from undertaking a particular activity. 172
This remedy has been applied in international disputes.
The tribunal in the Trail Smelter Arbitration ordered the
smelter to stop polluting the state of Washington.17 3 This was or-
dered in addition to an award of damages.174 A state injured by fall-
out from Chernobyl, therefore, should seek both compensation for
the damage already sustained and an injunction against future
harm. 17
VI. Conclusion
A state injured by radiation contamination from the Chernobyl
accident will have an arduous task in attempting to gain reparation
from the Soviet Union. The victim state first must prove that its
rights have been violated. It must further prove that the USSR was
responsible for that violation. A state must demonstrate that the So-
viet Union should be held liable for the damage sustained. In order
to accomplish this result, a country should choose to proceed under
the theory of liability which would afford it the greatest relief. The
injured state then must prove all of the elements under the appropri-
ate theory.
In addition to the choice of an appropriate theory, another im-
pediment is the difficulty of administering the international legal
process. This has been made cumbersome because relatively few dis-
putes have been voluntarily submitted to international tribunals for
adjudication. Under this ad hoc approach, no clear substantive or
procedural standards have developed, leaving countries to rely solely
on the decisions in the Corfu Channel Case and the Trail Smelter
Arbitration for guidance. Such inadequacy has prompted one writer
to make the following remarks in the aftermath of the Chernobyl
171. See Williams, supra note 51, at 161. This remedy is appropriate where the pollu-
tion is continuous, as in ocean dumping or the leaching of chemicals from factories. Id. One
author has proposed, however, that reparation for transnationally injurious conduct will be
granted, but an order for cessation of this conduct is not available. Liability as an Obligation,
supra note 129, at 67.
172. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 705 (5th ed. 1979).
173. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 57, at 687.
174. Id.
175. Both Sweden and West Germany have demanded that all Soviet nuclear reactors of
the Chernobyl type be eliminated. Deadly Meltdown, supra note 2, at 43.
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accident:
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet
Union on 25-26 April 1986 revealed a number of serious gaps in
the rules of international law . ..as regards the international
responsibility of a State, where such an accident occurs, to com-
pensate neighbouring States for the damage and harm suffered
as a consequence of the accident . . . . It remains to mention
that so far as concerns the definition and identification of inter-





Several nations have attempted to solve this dilemma by form-
ing agreements on environmental issues. One example is the bilateral
"Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protec-
tion Between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.' 17 While such agreements
are a step in the right direction, they are limited to research, explo-
ration, communication, and sharing information. 178 Consequently,
they are often too broad to be helpful.
Another way in which states have dealt with the problem has
been to enact agreements on specific issues. One such example is the
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy.' 79 This Convention is somewhat instructive, for it provides
that the operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable for dam-
age. 80 The type or standard of liability to be implemented, however,
is conspicuously absent. Furthermore, the Convention covers only
nuclear energy.
Writing in 1948, Professor Jessup recognized the need for a
general clarification on certain issues in international law. He stated:
It should be one of the tasks in the codification of international
law to catalogue the types of direct injuries to states for which
the state would be privileged to require another state to pay
176. The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident and International Law, 60 AUSTL. L.J. 586,
586-87 (1986) [hereinafter Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident]. This article also contains in-
formation concerning the general discussions on international regulatory standards to prevent
future meltdowns.
177. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23,
1972, United States-Soviet Union, - U.S.T. ., T.I.A.S. No. - , reprinted in 11
I.LM. 761 (1962).
178. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 106, at 332.
179. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, U.N. Doc. C/60/93, reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961). The signatories, all
European nations, consist of West Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and Turkey.
180. Id. at 1084. In addition to these documents, other suggestions as to how to deal
with this problem include the creation of an international body to specify precautions to be
taken both before and after a nuclear accident. Two draft international agreements have been
adopted by the International Atomic Energy Association. The topics are early notification and
mutual assistance. Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident, supra note 176, at 587.
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such indemnity as might be determined by an international tri-
bunal to be appropriate to the case.'81
This goal can best be accomplished perhaps by a multinational
treaty on transnational environmental pollution. Such a document
should set out definitions of the important terms, such as "pollution."
It also should include the doctrine of strict liability for both acci-
dents and ultrahazardous activities, since this doctrine appears to be
gaining acceptance by the international community. In addition, it
should provide for compensation where restitution in kind is impossi-
ble, and should not preclude the remedy of injunction.
A multinational treaty is the appropriate vehicle to apply and
delineate standards of conduct which would be acceptable to the
general international community. The creation of such a treaty
would inform both offending and victim states of their rights and
obligations under international law.
Victoria Riess Hartke
181. P. JESSUP, supra note 21, at 120.
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